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WIND’S HOWLING: APPLYING THE
CALIFORNIA TALENT AGENCIES ACT TO
ESPORTS ORGANIZATIONS TO ADDRESS
EVOLVING DISPARITIES
Connor Sletten*
I. INTRODUCTION
Esports has leveled up. As a seemingly limitless new frontier for
business, entertainment, and competition, esports has quickly grown
into a global phenomenon. Esports viewership has grown
exponentially over the years, from approximately 281 million viewers
in 20161 to around 496 million by February 2020; by 2023, viewership
is projected to grow to around 646 million.2 Meanwhile, Twitch, the
largest online streaming platform used by gamers, averaged over 2
million live concurrent viewers at any given time in 2020, up from
approximately 1.26 million average concurrent viewers in 2019.3
While the popularity of esports depends in part on the players and
in part on the professional teams they join, the players are young, often
foreign, and rarely have lawyers to represent their interests.4
* J.D. Candidate, May 2021, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. History, University of
California, Los Angeles, September 2012. A special thanks to Professor Robert Brain for his
guidance throughout the writing process and for consistently making law school a better experience
for students like me. Thank you to my wife, Jamie, for her endless love and support. Also, thank
you to my parents, family, and friends for always believing in me and encouraging me, and to the
members of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their tireless work.
1. Pavo Jurkić, Esports Audience Growth and the Future, ESPORTS INSIGHTS (Dec. 1, 2019),
https://esportsinsights.com/inside-esports/esports-audience-growth-and-the-future.
2. The
Incredible
Growth
of
Esports,
INFLUENCER
MKTG.
HUB,
https://influencermarketinghub.com/growth-of-esports-stats (last updated Nov. 2, 2020).
3. Twitch Statistics & Charts, TWITCHTRACKER, https://twitchtracker.com/statistics (last
visited Apr. 11, 2021).
4. See Riad Chikhani, League of Lawyers: Esports Is Creating a New Class of White-Collar
Jobs, VENTUREBEAT (Feb. 6, 2018, 3:30 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2018/02/06/league-oflawyers-esports-is-creating-a-new-class-of-white-collar-jobs/ (discussing the rise of specialized
esports lawyers as a response to players “not act[ing] in a professional manner when approaching
contract deals” and “often sign[ing] anything offered to them”). Perhaps this is because
international esports stars sign with teams when they are as young as twelve years old; for example,
in 2008, South Korean esports star Jun “TY” Tae Yang played his first professional esports match
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Meanwhile, the organizations that sign them are wealthy, savvy, and
represented by counsel.5 Because the professional gaming industry
remains largely unregulated,6 there is little to stop a sophisticated and
unscrupulous team from taking advantage of young and relatively
unsophisticated talent through oppressive contracts where players
often have to give up some or all of their ability to monetize their
personal brand. Professional gamers are subject to an industry
framework that presents roadblocks to collective bargaining and
uniform governance due to a general patchwork of regulatory
schemes, including leagues that implement their own selfgovernance.7 For example, Riot Games, a game developer and
publisher that created the incredibly popular game League of Legends,
sponsors and runs its own League of Legends league and has a history
of imposing significant restrictions on league participants, including
non-competition agreements restricting players from competing in
other professional gaming leagues.8 Further, the classification of
players as independent contractors, rather than employees, presents
yet another obstacle to efforts at unionization or even simple
uniformity of regulatory schemes that might further players’ rights.9
This unfairness has revealed itself in a lawsuit that, while recently
settled,10 raises issues that the entire esports industry should take to
at the age of thirteen, after signing with his team at twelve. Average Age in Esports vs. Major
Sports, ESPN (Sept. 17, 2017), https://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/20733853/the-averageage-esports-versus-nfl-nba-mlb-nhl (showing the average age of esports competitors as much lower
across the board compared with other professional athletics).
5. See Chikhani, supra note 4 (“[P]layers were at risk of being taken advantage of by . . .
team owners and sponsors.”); Christina Settimi, ‘Awful Business’ or the New Gold Rush? The Most
Valuable Companies in Esports Are Surging, FORBES (Nov. 5, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/christinasettimi/2019/11/05/awful-business-or-the-new-gold-rushthe-most-valuable-companies-in-esports-are-surging/.
6. See Jacqueline Martinelli, The Challenges of Implementing a Governing Body for
Regulating Esports, 26 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 499, 501 (2019) (noting that there is no
single governing body and addressing the challenges of effective regulation); Katherine E. Hollist,
Note, Time to Be Grown-Ups About Video Gaming: The Rising Esports Industry and the Need for
Regulation, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 823 (2015) (noting various impediments to the regulation of esports
and arguing that the economic magnitude of esports alone warrants regulation and offering
solutions to better regulate the industry).
7. See Hollist, supra note 6, at 829–30.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 839.
10. Julia Alexander, Tfue Settles Lawsuit Against Faze Clan Over ‘Oppressive’ Gaming
Contract, THE VERGE (Aug. 26, 2020, 5:08 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/8/26/21403052
/tfue-faze-clan-lawsuit-settled-streaming-events-competition-esports.

(12) 54.4_SLETTEN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/18/21 12:43 PM

2021] APPLYING THE TALENT AGENCIES ACT TO ESPORTS 1361

heart. Esports organizations are essentially collectives of gamers that
band together under one brand to roster teams in esports competitions,
stream live content globally over the internet, and generally promote
themselves through partnerships with brands and celebrities.11 As
esports as an industry has grown exponentially, so have esports
organizations.12 An esports organization called FaZe Clan, selfdescribed as “the most popular esports organization in the world,” has
taken advantage of the unregulated industry while operating in esports
competitions, streaming and content creation, merchandise, and
more.13 The organization freely signs young and promising esports
stars to its brand, such as popular professional gamer Turner “Tfue”
Tenney, with the promise of fame and fortune, in exchange for
restrictive, one-sided, and potentially unconscionable contractual
obligations.14
On May 20, 2019, Tfue filed suit against FaZe Clan for signing
him to an allegedly extreme and unconscionable contract.15 The
contract allocated significant percentages of earned revenue to FaZe
Clan, limited Tfue’s freedom to contract with sponsors, required Tfue
to wear certain clothing, and contained other terms that Tfue
considered unconscionable.16 Tfue settled the suit on undisclosed
terms and dismissed the suit on August 26, 2020.17
While FaZe Clan is one of the world’s largest esports
organizations, valued at $240 million as of November 2019,18 FaZe
11. See Katherine Liu, Introduction to Esports Organizations, LINEUPS (July 13, 2020, 4:00
PM), https://www.lineups.com/esports/introduction-to-esports-organizations/.
12. See id. (noting that esports organizations have a “solid foothold in the world of
entertainment”).
13. Callum Williams, The Top 5 Esports Organizations in the World, COLOSSUS BETS,
https://www.colossusbets.com/blog/top-five-esports-organizations (last accessed Apr. 11, 2021).
See generally FAZE CLAN, https://fazeclan.com/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2021), for an overview of the
organization’s scope.
14. See Noah Smith, A Pro ‘Fortnite’ Player Is Suing His Team and the Entire Esports World
Could Feel the Fallout, WASH. POST (May 21, 2019, 9:58 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/sports/2019/05/21/pro-fortnite-player-is-suing-his-team-entire-esports-world-could-feel-fallout/.
The article describes the lawsuit between gamer Turner Tenney over his lopsided contract with
FaZe Clan.
15. See, e.g., Nathan Grayson, Popular Streamer Sues FaZe Clan Over ‘Illegal’ Contract, but
the Organization Says the Contract Is Fine, KOTAKU (May 20, 2019, 4:45 PM),
https://kotaku.com/popular-streamer-sues-faze-clan-over-illegal-contract-1834898839.
16. Complaint, Tenney v. FaZe Clan Inc., No. 19STCV17341 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 20, 2019)
[hereinafter Complaint].
17. Alexander, supra note 10.
18. Settimi, supra note 5.
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Clan’s owner himself admitted that the contract terms given to Tfue
were “trash”—which “[n]obody ever disagreed with”—in May
2019.19 As esports has realized a massive growth in popularity,
professional gamers like Tfue are fighting for stronger protections,
recognizing that they are the driving force behind esports
organizations’ profits.
Tfue raised a novel argument in his suit, which spotlights an issue
that should make esports organizations second-guess the extent to
which they desire control over their contract stars’ professional lives.
Tfue alleged that FaZe Clan acted to procure work for him in violation
of the California Talent Agencies Act (TAA), section 1700 et seq. of
the California Labor Code.20 The TAA was “designed to protect artists
against iniquitous or overreaching conduct by certain personal
representatives”21 by forcing those who procure employment for
artists in California to obtain a license from the California Labor
Commissioner (CLC).22 The CLC has the power to void entire
contracts between artists and their unlicensed representatives who
procure work for them.23 Had Tfue prevailed on his claim, any esports
organization that procures business deals for its contract stars as artists
would fall under the scope of the TAA, subjecting each gamer’s
contract to necessary approvals from the CLC. While Tfue and FaZe
Clan have settled the dispute, a lack of judgment on the merits leaves
the important question of whether, and how, the TAA applies to
professional gamers open and unresolved. This issue would be one of
first impression for the CLC; thus, entire contracts between players
and organizations that are not properly licensed under the TAA, such
as FaZe Clan, could still potentially be voided if organizations are
careless in their dealings with gamers.
This Note will explore the legal landscape and structure of both
the TAA and the professional gaming industry. Importantly, the TAA
protects “artists,” which arguably includes professional gamers. Thus,
19. TheBlast Staff, FaZe Clan Owner Banks Admits Tfue’s ‘Contract Was Trash’ in War with
Pro Gamer, BLAST, https://theblast.com/faze-clan-banks-admits-contract-trash-tfue-esports/ (last
updated June 11, 2019, 10:56 PM).
20. Complaint, supra note 16, at 3.
21. James M. O’Brien III, Comment, Regulations of Attorneys Under California’s Talent
Agencies Act: A Tautological Approach to Protecting Artists, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 471, 473 (1992).
22. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700 et seq. (West, Westlaw through Ch. 9 of 2021 Reg. Sess.).
23. See, e.g., Styne v. Stevens, 26 P.3d 343, 346 (Cal. 2001) (holding that contracts with
unlicensed agents are “illegal and void ab initio”).
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this Note includes an examination of professional gamers both within
competitive esports, who play as athletes in tournaments, and also
within the online streaming space, where gamers stream video of
themselves playing videogames through online platforms for the
entertainment of viewers watching from home. These two realms
serve an important distinction when applying the TAA to professional
gamers, though they often overlap with each other. Tfue, FaZe Clan,
their relationship, and the now-settled lawsuit will serve as the lens
through which this Note reaches its ultimate conclusion: many
professional gamers, like Tfue, do qualify as artists under the TAA.
Thus, to the extent any esports organization without an agency license,
like FaZe Clan, procures work for their contract players in California
outside of professional team business such as tournaments, it acts as
an unlicensed agency in violation of the TAA.
II. ESPORTS, CALIFORNIA’S TALENT AGENCIES ACT, AND THE
LAWSUIT
a. The Big Picture: A Top-Heavy, Unregulated Industry
Professional esports athletes and online game streamers grapple
with a power imbalance and general lack of regulatory framework
within the esports industry, which opens the door for the sort of
imbalanced power dynamic that drives a player like Tfue to sign a
contract with an organization like FaZe Clan.
The professional gaming industry is unique when compared to
more traditional forms of entertainment, like film, television, music,
and sports. A professional gamer has myriad revenue sources to profit
from, primarily streaming, sponsorships, team salaries, and esports
tournaments.24 These revenue sources, however, are fundamentally
controlled by the IP owners; game developers and publishers
(hereinafter “Publishers”) hold the intellectual property rights to the
games that professional gamers compete and stream in, giving these
Publishers a significant amount of leeway in how they can control

24. See,
e.g.,
How
Do
Professional
Gamers
Make
Money,
TEKNOS,
https://www.teknosassociates.com/how-do-professional-gamers-make-money/
(last
visited
Apr. 11, 2021); Brian O’Connell, How Much Do Esports Players Make?, THESTREET (Feb. 12,
2020, 9:43 AM), https://www.thestreet.com/personal-finance/how-much-do-esports-playersmake-15126931. This is not an exhaustive list.

(12) 54.4_SLETTEN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1364

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

11/18/21 12:43 PM

[Vol. 54:1359

leagues, streaming platforms, and players.25 The rights to play games
professionally or stream online for entertainment are thus controlled
by Publishers.26 Professional gamers who exploit the Publishers’ IP
through the various sources briefly enumerated above have the
opportunity to earn significant payouts. Tournaments, for example,
have seen prize pools that reach upwards of $30 million.27 When a
player signs with an esports organization like FaZe Clan, as detailed
further below, that organization may sign them to a contract that
enables the player to leverage the brand and grow their28 fame and
fortune29 in exchange for a (not insignificant) cut of not only those
tournament winnings, but also every other revenue stream the player
earns from.30
i. Online Streaming: Publisher Control with Lucrative Opportunities
In the online streaming world, where gamers create videos of
themselves playing the game and then stream it live for their viewers,
Publishers generally allow such gamers (“Streamers”) to profit by
exploiting their IP through the use of online streaming platforms like
Twitch; Streamers earn money through subscriptions and donations
from their viewers, as well as through partnerships with streaming
platforms themselves.31 Publishers also recognize that popular
25. Copyright in Esports: A Top-Heavy Power Structure, but Is It Legally Sound?, DLA PIPER
(Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2018/09/ipt-news-q32018/copyright-in-esports/.
26. Id.
27. Mike Stubbs, The International 10 ‘Dota 2’ Tournament Prize Pool Breaks $30 Million,
FORBES (July 27, 2020, 4:05 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikestubbs/2020/07/27/theinternational-10-dota-2-tournament-prize-pool-breaks-30-million/.
28. This Note intentionally uses the singular pronoun “they/them.” While the singular “they”
has traditionally been discouraged in legal writing, legal writers are increasingly using the singular
“they” because of its usefulness and necessity. Heidi K. Brown, Get with the Pronoun, 17 LEGAL
COMMC’N & RHETORIC: JALWD 61, 61–62 (2020) (discussing the increased clarity and respect
that a singular “they” pronoun conveys); Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, 132 HARV. L.
REV. 895, 961–63 (2019) (discussing possible objections to requiring non-binary pronouns,
including potential grammar-based objections).
29. See Tfue, TWITCHTRACKER, https://twitchtracker.com/tfue/statistics (last visited Apr. 11,
2021). As discussed infra in Section II.b, Tfue’s fame skyrocketed after signing with FaZe Clan.
30. See generally TheBlast Staff, ‘Fortnite’ Gamer Tfue’s Contract with FaZe Clan Finally
Revealed!, THEBLAST (June 11, 2019, 10:56 PM), https://theblast.com/esports-gamer-tfue-fazeclan-contract-revealed/ (discussing Tfue’s contractual relinquishment to FaZe Clan of high
percentages of his earnings).
31. Id.; How Do Twitch Streamers Make Money?, MEDIAKIX, https://mediakix.com/blog
/how-do-twitch-streamers-make-money/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
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Streamers bring revenue to the business, and have created programs to
help them share in certain in-game purchases, including purchases
surrounding user-generated content. For example, affiliate programs
such as Epic Games’ “Support-A-Creator Program” allow the
Streamers to take a share of in-game purchases in games like Fortnite,
one of the most popular streaming games,32 when fans enter a “Creator
Code” at checkout that is linked to the Streamer’s account.33 When a
player makes a purchase in Fortnite with a linked Creator Code, the
Streamer associated with that Creator Code will get a cut of the sale.34
Further, once Streamers get popular enough, they can generate
revenue through sponsorship deals encompassing the creation of
sponsored streams, the sale of sponsored merchandise, and more.35
Capitalizing on this popularity, Streamers can also sign high-profile
exclusivity deals with one of the various streaming platforms;
illustrative of just how lucrative these can be, prolific streamer Ninja
was allegedly paid between $20 million and $30 million to leave
Twitch in favor of Microsoft’s Mixer in 2019.36 Ninja has since
returned exclusively to Twitch on undisclosed terms, though an
undoubtedly large sum of money was involved.37 Often, individuals
might choose to sign with a professional esports organization, like
FaZe Clan, to help maximize fame, exposure, and profit; in return, the
player relinquishes a share of their earnings to the organization.38

32. The Most Watched Games on Twitch, March 2021, TWITCHMETRICS,
https://www.twitchmetrics.net/games/viewership (last visited Apr. 11, 2021). In March 2021,
Fortnite was the fourth most watched game on Twitch, with over 101.4 million hours of streamed
content watched.
33. Support-A-Creator Program, EPIC GAMES, https://www.epicgames.com/affiliate/enUS/overview#eligible (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
34. Id. Streamers will get a minimum of 5% of in-game sales if they are eligible for the
Support-A-Creator program. Id.
35. How Do Twitch Streamers Make Money?, supra note 31.
36. Ben Gilbert, Ninja Reportedly Got Paid Between $20 Million and $30 Million by Microsoft
to Leave Amazon’s Twitch Streaming Service, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 27, 2020, 11:57 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-much-did-ninja-make-for-leaving-twitch-2020-1.
37. See Nathan Grayson, Ninja Is Back Exclusively on Twitch, KOTAKU (Sept. 10, 2020, 12:25
PM), https://kotaku.com/ninja-is-exclusively-back-on-twitch-1845013346.
38. These organizations are discussed in greater detail later in this Note. See TheBlast Staff,
supra note 30 (discussing Tfue’s contractual relinquishment to FaZe Clan of high percentages of
his earnings).
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ii. Esports Leagues: Publisher Control with Competitive Allure
Meanwhile, esports leagues are either owned directly by
Publishers or run by third parties that license Publishers’ IP.39 Esports
leagues, akin to more traditional sports leagues, are generally
dedicated to competitive play between esports gamers (hereinafter
“Athletes”) in a tournament-style environment. Professional gamers,
as esports athletes,
compete directly against other competitors in one-on-one
events (like [real world] tennis); others play in team events
where teammates assume different roles and work
cooperatively to score points against other teams (like
basketball); and still others compete by allowing each
competitor to take a turn and then compare their ultimate
times/scores (like Olympic skiing or gymnastics).40
Leagues vary significantly. Some are dedicated solely to one
game and are Publisher-owned, like Activision Blizzard’s Overwatch
League or Call of Duty League.41 Others are dedicated to multiple
games and owned by third parties.42 For example, ESL (formerly
Electronic Sports League43), the world’s largest esports company, acts
as a host for branded tournaments and international gaming world
championships.44 ESL has some 242 million fans globally and has
operated for over 20 years.45
Further, some leagues are beginning to model themselves in a
manner that parallels traditional professional sports leagues by having
permanent regional teams intended to provide “something new to e39. Cecilia D’Anastasio, Esports Pros Have ‘Dream’ Jobs—but Game Publishers Have All
the Power, WIRED (Sept. 10, 2020. 1:30 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/esports-pros-laborgame-publishers-power/; Copyright in Esports, supra note 25.
40. Hollist, supra note 6, at 826.
41. See D’Anastasio, supra note 39.
42. See Harry Alford, The 2017 Esports Ecosystem Explained in One Chart, MEDIUM (Oct. 2,
2017), https://medium.com/humble-ventures/the-2017-esports-ecosystem-explained-in-one-chartef6fc48b779e; Andrew Webster, Why Competitive Gaming Is Starting to Look a Lot Like
Professional Sports, THE VERGE (July 27, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/7/2
7/17616532/overwatch-league-of-legends-nba-nfl-esports.
43. Our Story, ESL GAMING GMBH, https://about.eslgaming.com/history/ (last visited
Apr. 11, 2021).
44. About Us, ESL GAMING GMBH, https://about.eslgaming.com/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
45. Id.; Feature Interview: ESL Is the World’s Largest Esports Company, BUGG REPORT
(Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.buggreport.com.au/feature-interview-esl-is-the-worlds-largestesports-company/.
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sports: stability.”46 Activision Blizzard’s Overwatch League, for
example, has twenty city-based teams with a 280-match regular
season, and even has an all-star tournament and playoffs.47
Additionally, the NBA has partnered with Publisher Take-Two to
launch the NBA 2K League and held its first draft in April 2018 with
“all of the pomp and circumstance normally reserved for players on
the court.”48 The inaugural live draft in 2018 was attended by NBA
Commissioner Adam Silver, who announced the picks, and just like
the actual NBA draft, it had a podium with dynamic backdrop, a live
audience, and expert commentators.49 It was broadcast live on NBA
TV and Twitch, and NBA team owners like Mark Cuban called the
players personally to deliver the selection news to their draft picks.50
Regulation of esports leagues is a major issue that both the
leagues themselves and the players grapple with. Unlike traditional
professional sports leagues, there are no formal collective bargaining
organizations or governing regulatory bodies to set guidelines for pay,
player benefits, or IP rights.51 While some efforts at unionization are
underway, leagues or teams are in complete control of player salaries
and even player conduct policies.52 Riot Games, for example,
established the League of Legends Champions Series (LCS) Players’
Association in 2017, stating “[i]t is important . . . that the players have
a voice.”53 But as the LCS Players’ Association is run and funded by
the Publisher, it “has led some to question its motives”; further, it is
not actually a true union in the sense that traditional players’
associations are in leagues like the NBA and MLB because it was
46. Webster, supra note 42.
47. What Is the Overwatch League, OVERWATCH LEAGUE, https://overwatchleague.com/enus/about (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
48. AJ Willingham, What Is Esports? A Look at an Explosive Billion-Dollar Industry, CNN
(Aug. 27, 2018, 2:18 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/27/us/esports-what-is-video-gameprofessional-league-madden-trnd/index.html.
49. Tim Bontemps, With 2K League Draft Mirroring Actual NBA Draft, Pro League Shows
It’s Serious About Esports, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2018, 2:09 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.c
om/news/sports/wp/2018/04/04/with-2k-league-draft-mirroring-actual-nba-draft-pro-leagueshows-its-serious-about-esports/.
50. Id.
51. See Uriah Tagle, As North American Esports Levels Up, Its Players Lag Behind, 19 TEX.
REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 81, 81 (2019).
52. Id. at 81–87.
53. See Kieran Darcy, Riot’s Players’ Association Lays Groundwork for Unionization, ESPN
(June 12, 2017), https://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/19617991/riot-players-association-laysgroundwork-unionization.
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founded by, and remains controlled by, the Publisher.54 To some, this
seems instead to be Riot’s attempt to “assert control over the players
through [the association] if they're the primary or only funding
source.”55 To illustrate Riot’s centralized control over the league: “as
both the league organizer and the game developer, Riot Games can
ban a player from participation in a league and even from the game
entirely.”56
The IP owner’s unilateral power represents a significant level of
centralized control over competitive athletic esports events.
Additionally, where the majority of consumption happens over the
internet, sale of streaming rights online often results in, as one
commentator has described it, “imbalanced profit sharing between the
league, the teams, and the remaining esports market participants.”57
Some organizations, such as the Esports Integrity Coalition (ESIC)
have tried to establish a regulatory framework to prevent match-fixing,
cheating, and doping.58 Others, like the World Esports Association
(WESA) have attempted to set a greater standard for player rights and
esports policy, including general league rules and guidelines covering
player transfers; the ESL pro league for the game Counter-Strike:
Global Offensive is a member of WESA.59 Other attempts at
establishing a formalized governing body have seen mixed results, but
ultimately the crowded landscape of competing regulatory bodies fails
to win the legitimacy necessary for teams and leagues to follow one
uniform and universal set of rules.60
iii. Player Organizations: Power in Numbers, but Beware
Overreaching
Amidst the leagues and the players lie the player organizations
(hereinafter “POs”), like FaZe Clan, who might field one team in one
league, or multiple teams in multiple leagues, and often also maintain
an entertainment arm dedicated to online streaming, all housed under

54. Id.
55. Id. (alteration in original).
56. Laura L. Chao, Note, “You Must Construct Additional Pylons”: Building a Better
Framework for Esports Governance, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 737, 756 (2017).
57. Id. at 755.
58. Martinelli, supra note 6, at 506.
59. Id. at 507.
60. Id. at 509–10.
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one banner in order to profit as a brand.61 While these POs vary in size,
scope, and fame,62 the most prolific POs have made massive strides in
popularity, effectively “blend[ing] lifestyle and gaming.”63 These
organizations branch out in a multitude of ways, such as celebrity
endorsements, in a constant grind for a larger fanbase. One such
relationship occurred when FaZe Clan member, FaZe Temperr, paired
with young basketball superstar Ben Simmons for the first digital
cover of SLAM magazine in February 2020.64
Esports POs take on sponsorships, advertising deals, and
merchandising in order to bring in revenue.65 The PO might also take
on outside investors, including venture capital firms and individuals—
for example, popular esports organization 100 Thieves has taken on
multiple rounds of investments, including investments from famous
rapper Drake,66 as well as $35 million of Series B funding in July
2019.67 Part of the attraction of 100 Thieves to outside investors is the
effective characterization of the brand beyond esports, as a “lifestyle
brand[]” that has had multiple “apparel drops” sell out “in less than 20
minutes.”68 Likewise, Team Envy, a large Texas-based esports
organization, recently added rapper Post Malone to its ownership
group.69 Consequently, to a prolific streamer who is able to build up a
significant personal following, joining a powerhouse PO brand that
61. For example, Team Liquid, one of the other largest esports organizations along with FaZe
Clan, has raked in over $36 million in prize money as of April 2021 in 1,926 tournaments alone.
Team Rankings, ESPORTS EARNINGS, https://www.esportsearnings.com/teams (last visited
Apr. 11, 2021).
62. See, e.g., The World’s Greatest Esports Teams, RANKER, https://www.ranker.com/list
/best-esports-teams/ranker-games?ref=also_ranked&pos=1&a=0&l=85373584&ltype=n&g=0
(last updated Sept. 1, 2020) (ranking the top esports teams).
63. See, e.g., Franklyn Calle, Ben Simmons and FaZe Temperrr Featured on First Digital
Cover of Slam, SLAM (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.slamonline.com/esports/ben-simmons-andfaze-temperrr-slam/.
64. See id. FaZe Temperr and Ben Simmons also played Call of Duty together for the piece.
65. Mitch Reames, How Esports Organizations Make Money, HOTSPAWN (May 8, 2019, 2:32
PM), https://www.hotspawn.com/guides/how-esports-organizations-make-money/.
66. Matt Perez, Drake and Scooter Braun Invest in Esports Company 100 Thieves, FORBES
(Oct. 23, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mattperez/2018/10/23/drake-and-scooterbraun-invest-in-esports-company-100-thieves/.
67. See Alex Wilhelm, A Snapshot of Venture and Startup Activity in Esports, CRUNCHBASE
(Nov. 15, 2019), https://news.crunchbase.com/news/a-snapshot-of-venture-and-startup-activityin-esports.
68. Perez, supra note 66.
69. O’Melveny Advises Envy Gaming as It Adds Post Malone to Ownership Group,
O’MELVENY
(Sept. 2,
2020),
https://www.omm.com/our-firm/media-center/pressreleases/omelveny-advises-envy-gaming-as-it-adds-post-malone-to-ownership-group.
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branches out far beyond any particular video game has proven a
compelling option,70 allowing both the individual and the PO to
benefit.
A typical player-signee might look familiar to those who follow
more traditional sports. Sought-after esports players may be
considered “free agents” before signing with a PO; their place on a
team may be subject to league approval, and the league might have
minimum required salaries.71 Riot Games, for example, has significant
control over minimum player salaries, contract approval, and even
designates a free agency period in its League of Legends professional
league.72 Teams can trade pieces of their rosters with one another, and
owners can even purchase entire rosters to buy into a league.73
Ultimately, given the top-heavy power structure, the lack of collective
bargaining, and the lack of any regulatory body ensuring strong
players’ rights, it is of little surprise that a talented young gamer would
turn to an organization like FaZe Clan to fill in gaps, secure gainful
employment, and bring one’s brand into global recognition.
A PO that builds a bridge between the professional gamer and
fame may act as a both a boon and a curse. Where the clout of an
established brand can bring an instant boost to popularity, it can also
present a disparity in bargaining position that allows an organization
to take advantage of the unsophisticated young gamer. Because hopes
of a “pan-esports governing body”74 are, at best, in their infancy,
Tfue's lawsuit against FaZe Clan exposes one potential bulwark
against exploitation of the professional gamer in already-existing law
with the TAA; thus, the balance of power in esports may finally begin
to tip in the individual professional gamer’s favor.
b. The Game in Focus: FaZe Clan and Tfue
Tfue is a professional gamer who is no stranger to controversy.
Hailing from Indian Rocks, Florida, the 23-year-old gamer began
70. See Perez, supra note 66 (100 Thieves’ founder, Matthew “Nadeshot” Haag, has millions
of followers personally, but wants to use the 100 Thieves name to “enable his players to do the
same for themselves.”).
71. See Graham Ashton, How the Esports Player Transfer Market Differs from Soccer or the
NBA, ESPORTS OBSERVER (Jan. 6, 2020), https://esportsobserver.com/esports-player-transfers2020/.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Chao, supra note 56, at 761.
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making waves in the game Fortnite in 2018, where he quickly became
recognized as one of the best players in the world.75 While he also
streamed games such as Call of Duty and H1Z1, his initial popularity
rose from the ashes of his unwitting competitors in Fortnite.76 On
April 30, 2018, Tfue officially became a member of FaZe Clan,
signing to compete with its team FaZe Fortnite and more generally
become part of the team's various business arms.77 In due time, Tfue’s
fandom exploded. He went from 148,609 Twitch followers on
April 30, 2018, to over 1 million Twitch followers by the end of June,
2018; as of March 31, 2021, he had 10.2 million Twitch followers, and
streamed 9,080 hours of gameplay on the platform in total.78 He has
the second most Twitch followers in the world, still far off from
prolific gamer Ninja’s 16.9 million followers, but an incredible
achievement nonetheless for the young star.79
Tfue’s professional gaming career has been mired in controversy
on more than one occasion. For example, he was temporarily banned
from Twitch for saying a racial slur on one of his streams in May
2018.80 Further, he was permanently banned from Epic Games for
buying and selling accounts in July 2018 and banned again from
Twitch for an undisclosed reason later that same month.81 He even
muttered yet another racial slur in September 2019, and though he
avoided a Twitch ban, it stirred further outrage.82
Even though Tfue is clearly no angel himself, there is no denying
that he has become one of the biggest names in professional gaming
today. He has built up an enormous following, with 5.1 million
followers on Instagram and 4.1 million followers on Twitter as of

75. Ford James, Who is Tfue? Everything You Need to Know About the Ex-FaZe Clan Fortnite
Star, GAMESRADAR+ (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.gamesradar.com/who-is-tfue-fortnite-twitchyoutube.
76. Id.
77. Id.; Saahil Agnelo Periwal, Fortnite Pro Tfue Settles Dispute with FaZe Clan,
SPORTSKEEDA (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.sportskeeda.com/esports/fortnite-pro-tfue-settlesdispute-faze-clan.
78. Tfue, supra note 29.
79. Twitch Streamers with the Most Followers, TWITCHTRACKER, https://twitchtracker.com
/channels/most-followers (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
80. James, supra note 75.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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March 31, 2021.83 Further, his net worth is estimated to be $4–6
million (though some rumors peg his streaming earnings to be in
excess of $20 million), with estimated YouTube earnings alone in
excess of $1 million per year.84
Tfue likely can credit much of his meteoric rise in popularity to
his affiliation with FaZe Clan. The numbers do not lie: soon after
signing with FaZe Clan, Tfue saw a steep increase in followers. On
the day he signed with FaZe Clan, he had a respectable 148,609
followers on Twitch, but 6 months later he had over 3.3 million.85 This
undeniable correlation also begs the question of how much he may
have reciprocated, for it must also be true that FaZe Clan benefitted
by having one of the best Fortnite players in the world in the fold.86
Ultimately, no matter the reward, Tfue’s lawsuit raises legitimate
concerns that are the seemingly inevitable consequences of the
unchecked growth of professional gaming, esports organizations, and
professional gamers in an unregulated space.
FaZe Clan, on the other hand, began as a YouTube channel in
2010.87 A few gamers named FaZe ClipZ, FaZe Resistance, and FaZe
Housecat (later named Timid) became popular for their YouTube
videos in which they performed “trick shots” with sniper rifles in the
video game Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2.88 A trick shot is when
the player, in order to add flair to an ordinary in-game kill, adds
superfluous motion such as spinning the cursor in circles while
jumping as they virtually kill their opponent.89 Current co-manager,
83. Tfue (@Tfue), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/tfue (last visited Apr. 11, 2021);
Tfue (@TTfue), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/TTfue (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
84. Jamie Hore, Who is Tfue? Net Worth, Earnings, Streaming Setup, and More, THE
LOADOUT, https://www.theloadout.com/streamers/tfue/net-worth-streaming-setup (last updated
Aug. 27, 2020).
85. Tfue, supra note 29.
86. Indeed, in October 2018, just months after signing with FaZe, Tfue and then-FaZe-partner
Cloakzy won a $400,000 grand prize in a Fortnite tournament, and he won numerous other prizes
while under the FaZe banner. See FaZe Clan/Tournament Results, GAMEPEDIA, https://fortniteesports.gamepedia.com/FaZe_Clan/Tournament_Results (last visited Apr. 11, 2021); see also
James, supra note 75 (“Tfue has won numerous online and offline tournaments, including the Fall
Skirmish event at Twitchcon 2018 and Week 3 of the World Cup North American east coast
qualifiers.”).
87. Emir Mehmedćehajić, FaZe Clan History, PREZI (Sept. 22, 2017), https://prezi.com/p/xgl2sipbkj3/faze-clan-history.
88. Id.
89. How to Trickshot in Call of Duty, WIKIHOW, https://www.wikihow.com/Trickshot-inCall-of-Duty (last updated Aug. 11, 2020).
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FaZe Temperr, eventually came into the fold, and the team members
started becoming more interactive with their followers on YouTube.90
By 2011, FaZe Clan had its first esports roster and competed in Major
League Gaming.91 Moving beyond the Call of Duty franchise, in 2016
it acquired an international Counter Strike: Global Offensive team to
expand its competitive roster.92 FaZe Clan currently represents
multiple professional esports rosters that span over six different
gaming franchises, including Fortnite, Counter Strike: Global
Offensive, Call of Duty, FIFA, Tom Clancy's Rainbow Six, and
Playerunknown's Battlegrounds.93 In competitive play, FaZe Clan has
altogether collected nearly $9.2 million in tournament prize money in
21 different countries.94
FaZe Clan has quickly ascended the ranks to become an
immensely popular brand, sporting some notable cross-media
members such as rapper Lil Yachty and Pittsburgh Steelers wide
receiver JuJu Smith-Schuster.95 The brand has approximately 8.61
million subscribers on YouTube,96 5.3 million followers on Twitter,97
and 10.9 million followers on Instagram.98 On an individual level,
some FaZe Clan team members have millions of their own followers.99
Beyond competitive esports, FaZe Clan has over seventy team
members that stream live on Twitch; tens of thousands of viewers
regularly and simultaneously watch any given team members’ livestream.100 FaZe Clan rounds out the full fan experience by selling

90. Mehmedćehajić, supra note 87.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Our Pro Teams, FAZE CLAN, https://fazeclan.com/pages/esports (last visited Apr. 11,
2021).
94. FaZe Clan, ESPORTS EARNINGS, https://www.esportsearnings.com/teams/240-faze-clan
(last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
95. Khal, From Gaming to Gumball: The Rise of FaZe Clan, COMPLEX (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://www.complex.com/pop-culture/2018/08/the-rise-of-faze-clan.
96. FaZe Clan, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCNdpD9V0PIrH1glUJ6RG4
-w (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
97. FaZe Clan (@FaZeClan), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/fazeclan?lang=en (last visited
Apr. 11, 2021).
98. FaZe Clan (@fazeclan), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/fazeclan/?hl=en (last
visited Apr. 11, 2021).
99. FaZe Banks, for example, has 2.8 million followers on Instagram alone at the time of
writing. Faze Banks (@banks), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/banks (last visited
Apr. 11, 2021).
100. FaZe, TWITCH, https://www.twitch.tv/team/faze (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
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branded merchandise, such as sweatshirts, hats, sandals, and
jerseys.101
Fulfilling its vision of a “lifestyle brand,” FaZe Clan has extended
into the entertainment space in multiple ways, including an upcoming
reality show to search for its next “gaming star,”102 and even
participation in the Gumball 3000 Rally, where, in 2018, the team
spent seven days (virtually) taking its fans with them on a journey
from London to Tokyo in a Rolls Royce and a Ferrari.103 Naturally,
the cars were sponsored, and FaZe Clan went so far as to sell special
Gumball-themed merchandise to provide the full experience.104 FaZe
Clan members also live together in a multi-million dollar Los Angeles
mansion, where the organization allegedly pays $80,000 per month to
rent a nearly 13,000 square foot home complete with its own gym.105
Thus, the PO lives up to its self-characterization as “[b]ridging the gap
between gaming, content & culture since 2010.”106
FaZe Clan clearly recognizes that in order to become a truly
successful brand, it cannot rest easy on tournament winnings for
competitive gaming. Its brilliant and expansive marketing and brandbuilding has proven the viability of the professional gaming industry
as more than just a game. Consequently, however, as the organization
expands into a multi-faceted entertainment and lifestyle powerhouse,
the consequences of short-sighted dealings are catching up with it.
Tfue’s lawsuit, discussed later, has shed light on how the organization
wields power over unscrupulous gamers who want the benefits of a
partnership with FaZe Clan.

101. FaZe Clan Official Shop, FAZE CLAN, https://fazeclan.com/collections/store (last visited
Apr. 11, 2021); FaZe Pro Shop, FAZE CLAN, https://fazeclan.com/collections/pro-shop (last visited
Apr. 11, 2021).
102. Nick Statt, Faze Clan Is Launching a Quibi Reality Show to Sign Its Next Gaming Star,
THE VERGE (Feb. 4, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/2/4/21121975/faze-clanquibi-reality-show-contest-gaming-e-sports.
103. Khal, supra note 95.
104. Id.
105. The New FaZe House Is Being Rented for $80,000 Per Month, FAMOUS CELEBRITY
HOMES (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.famouscelebrityhomes.com/new-faze-house-2020.
106. FaZe Clan, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/TheFaZeClan (last visited Apr. 11,
2021).
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c. The Act: What is an Artist?
The TAA regulates the procurement of employment for “artists”
as defined by the act.107 An artist under the TAA includes actors and
actresses, musicians, directors, composers, and more.108 However, the
California legislature also left the term open ended, to broadly
encompass “other artists and persons rendering professional services
in motion picture, theatrical, radio, television[,] and other
entertainment enterprises.”109 The CLC has generally taken a broad
approach to the definition of who constitutes an artist; that is, leaning
on the “other artists and persons” language in the act referenced above.
For example, Duane “Dog” Chapman was considered an artist under
the act for his contributions to the show “Dog the Bounty Hunter” in
spite of his licensed profession as a bounty hunter and bail bondsman,
rather than an “actor.”110 Here, the CLC noted the language of the act
specifically includes persons “other than actors or actresses.”111
Famous boxer Ray Leonard was deemed an artist for his host position
on “The Contender” as well, because his name and likeness were used
to boost ratings and advertisement revenue.112 In 2002, Billy Blanks,
a martial artist who created TaeBo, was declared an artist under the
act by the CLC because “Blanks’ fame as an athlete and creator of
TaeBo[] resulted in production companies desiring to use his likeness
to boost ratings, which would inevitably attract more advertisers.”113
Thus, it is clear that the CLC embraces the broad language in the TAA
of who qualifies as an artist. While a typical actor or actress is an
obvious and usual focal point of the TAA, when one’s name or
107. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700 et seq. (West, Westlaw through Ch. 9 of 2021 Reg. Sess.).
108. Id. § 1700.4.
109. Id. (emphasis added). The full statutory list includes: “actors and actresses rendering
services on the legitimate stage and in the production of motion pictures, radio artists, musical
artists, musical organizations, directors of legitimate stage, motion picture[,] and radio productions,
musical directors, writers, cinematographers, composers, lyricists, arrangers, models, and other
artists and persons rendering professional services in motion picture, theatrical, radio, television[,]
and other entertainment enterprises.”
110. Determination of Controversy at 4, 11, Chapman v. Krutonog, No. TAC 3351 (Cal. Lab.
Comm’r Oct. 31, 2012).
111. Id. at 11. The CLC also went on the find that “Dog” and his crew did, in fact, qualify as
actors under the Act as well.
112. See Determination of Controversy at 8, Leonard v. Rebney, No. TAC 23-04 (Cal. Lab.
Comm’r Jul. 1, 2005).
113. Determination of Controversy at 6–7, Billy Blanks v. Jeffrey Greenfield, No. TAC 27-00
(Cal. Lab. Comm’r Mar. 11, 2002) (emphasis omitted) (holding Greenfield operated as an
unlicensed talent agency under the Act).
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likeness is used to boost marketability within any medium of
entertainment, that person is considered an artist under the TAA,
subjecting those who procure work for that artist to the Act’s statutory
restrictions.
The TAA regulations further apply to a “person” procuring work
for an artist, meaning individuals, companies, societies, firms,
partnerships, associations, corporations, limited liability companies,
managers, or their agents or employees.114 If this “person” procures
work for an artist, he or she is considered a “talent agency.”115 The
TAA defines “talent agency” as “a person or corporation who engages
in the occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to
procure employment or engagements for an artist or artists,” and
further clarifies that a talent agency “may, in addition, counsel or
direct artists in the development of their professional careers.”116
Critically, talent agencies must apply for a license from the CLC to
operate as a talent agency,117 whose approval then necessarily subjects
licensed agencies to a number of statutory regulations, including
submitting artist contracts to the CLC for approval,118 posting copies
of laws in the office,119 and even making all books, records, and other
papers available for inspection by the CLC upon request.120
Additionally, the TAA regulates the conduct of the talent agency. For
example, agents are prohibited from sending their clients to unsafe
locations, sending a minor to a place where alcohol is furnished or
consumed, or allowing persons of bad character, such as gamblers or
strippers, into agency places of business.121 Thus, in order to procure
employment for an artist in California, the prospective “agent” must
apply for and obtain an agency license, and then follow the various
regulations of the TAA.
Further, California case law is clear: even if the person engages
in some legal activities under a contract, public policy requires that
courts “deter [unlicensed individuals] from engaging in illegal
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.
Id. § 1700.4(a).
Id.
Id. § 1700.5.
Id. § 1700.23.
Id. § 1700.28.
Id. § 1700.27.
Id. § 1700.33–1700.35.
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activities.”122 Thus, an artist’s contract with an unlicensed talent agent
is “illegal and void ab initio.”123 While the California Supreme Court
has recognized that the doctrine of severability may, under the right
circumstances, apply to contracts under which illegal procurement of
employment took place, application of the doctrine of severability
generally remains within the sole discretion of the CLC.124
Historically, the CLC has been reluctant to apply severability—
“severance is never available to permit partial recovery of
commissions for [] services that required no talent agency license.”125
The CLC has ultimately recognized a narrow exception, applying
severability where the procurement of employment is “collateral to the
main objective of the contract.”126 Evaluating this, the CLC relies
primarily on the central purpose of the contract, and thus whether a
main focus of the agreement was procuring employment for an artist
unlawfully.127 Courts hold the CLC’s views, “if not clearly
erroneous,” are “entitled to substantial weight,”128 and therefore courts
generally decline to question the CLC’s authority in applying the
TAA. For example, even where the TAA uses the word “occupation”
in a way that may imply that an agent is only subject to the TAA “[i]f
the agent’s employment procurement function constitutes a significant
part of the agent’s business as a whole,”129 courts have chosen to defer
to the CLC: “[t]he weight of authority is that even the incidental or
occasional provision of such services requires licensure.”130
Therefore, if an unlicensed person procures employment even once,
he or she is subject to adjudication, and a possible voiding of the
contract, by the CLC.131
122. Yoo v. Robi, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 740, 750 (2005).
123. Styne v. Stevens, 26 P.3d 343, 346 (Cal. 2001); see Yoo, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 750–51; see
also Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prods., Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 446–47 (1995) (finding an artist’s
contract with an unlicensed talent agent to be unenforceable).
124. See Marathon Ent., Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 750–53 (Cal. 2008).
125. Id. at 754.
126. Determination of Controversy at 19–21, Yoakam v. The Fitzgerald Hartley Co., No. TAC
8774 (Cal. Lab. Comm’r. Jan. 11, 2010).
127. See Determination of Controversy at 4–5, Kyle Bluff v. Paris Djon, No. TAC-17277 (Cal.
Lab. Comm’r Nov. 17, 2011).
128. Marathon Ent., Inc., 174 P.3d at 748.
129. Wachs v. Curry, 16 Cal. Rptr. 496, 503 (1993).
130. Marathon Ent., Inc., 174 P.3d at 748 (citing Styne v. Stevens, 26 P.3d 343, 349 (Cal. 2001)
(alteration in original)).
131. Id. (discussing the issue of “occupation” and determining “we likewise conclude the Act
extends to individual incidents of procurement”); see Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prods., Inc., 48 Cal.
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III. THE ACT APPLIED: HOW THE TAA CAN HELP PROTECT
PROFESSIONAL GAMERS
a. The Gamer: Athlete, Entertainer, or Both?
To better understand the issues in applying the TAA to gamers, it
is important to recognize that there are two classes of professional
gamers: (1) esports Athletes and (2) Streamers. Esports athletes are
professional gamers who play competitively in esports leagues, earn
salaries from their team, and hope to take a share in tournament prize
winnings.132 Streamers, on the other hand, are professional contentcreators who live-stream video of themselves playing the games via
online platforms such as Twitch.133 Athletes and Streamers may seem
like two sides of the same coin, but ultimately they play different roles
that may distinguish them as applied to the TAA.
Professional gamers, whether Athletes or Streamers, are similar
in multiple ways. Both esports Athletes and Streamers benefit
significantly from sponsorship deals: data on esports revenue streams
shows that over 40% of all esports revenue in 2019 came from
sponsorships, totaling nearly $457 million out of $1.1 billion.134
Further, both Athletes and Streamers are commonly part of esports
POs, like FaZe Clan or 100 Thieves; these organizations recognize
that “a business model specifically predicated on their success in
esports competitions is not a viable long-term solution,” and thus sign
popular young online Streamers to act as content-creators under the
PO’s brand, in turn bringing more fans and revenue to the organization
as a whole.135 By signing high-profile Streamers to the PO, the
organization hopes to “build a more recognizable brand” that will
ultimately maximize profits.136
Major differences arise, however, when you look at what an
Athlete and Streamer each regularly do day-to-day. While esports
Athletes are training for hours upon hours every day to compete at the

Rptr. 2d 437, 442 (1995) (discussing the CLC’s blunt rejection of the argument that purely
“incidental” procurement of employment is not forbidden).
132. Josh Chapman, Gaming—Athletes vs Entertainers, MEDIUM (July 11, 2019),
https://medium.com/konvoy/gaming-athletes-vs-entertainers-a3118c6dc89.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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highest level, the Streamers are engaging with fanbases and creating a
persona to better market themselves and maximize viewership on a
stream.137 The Streamers “in the gaming ecosystem have essentially
monopolized headlines and get their best gaming clips posted across
almost every social platform. It’s much tougher to market a
professional when they aren’t in front of a camera for 100% of their
day.”138 Thus, for a pure esports Athlete, it is more likely that the
organization with which an Athlete is affiliated, and not the Athlete
themselves, creates marketability. Further, someone who markets
themselves primarily through streaming faces an incredibly
demanding schedule of constant content-creation, where “[e]ven the
top streamers lose tons of subscribers when only being gone for short
periods of time.”139 Meanwhile, an esports Athlete may see more
overall stability in the brand behind the team, and thus spend more of
their time practicing to become a stronger competitor rather than
cultivating an ever-demanding fanbase.140 For example, before his
move from Twitch to a streaming platform called Mixer,141 Shroud, a
former professional esports Athlete who has since become a “prolific
streamer,”142 streamed over 7,500 hours of content between November
2016 and October 2019 on Twitch, while growing from around
745,000 followers to nearly 7.07 million followers in that 3-year
span.143 Meanwhile, many professional esports Athletes will focus on
one single game for 12–14 hours straight per day in order to reach the
apex of their abilities, meaning both the Athlete and the Streamer
subject themselves to grueling schedules, though under different
circumstances.144 Clearly, a natural ability to excel at gaming does not
necessarily make a professional esports Athlete an entertaining
Streamer, nor does a prolific Streamer necessarily have the pure skill
to become a professional esports Athlete. While gamers such as Tfue
and Shroud have shown success in both realms, there are esports
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Ben Walker, Shroud Is Moving to Mixer, DOT ESPORTS (Oct. 24, 2019, 12:13 PM),
https://dotesports.com/streaming/news/shroud-is-moving-to-mixer.
142. Chapman, supra note 132.
143. Shroud: Statistics, TWITCHTRACKER, https://twitchtracker.com/shroud/statistics (last
visited Apr. 11, 2021).
144. Chapman, supra note 132.
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Athletes that would not be able to garner recognition for themselves
without the PO backing them.145 Because some, like Tfue, have
crossed the line and live in both worlds, there is a subset of
professional gamers that can rightfully be considered some sort of
hybrid Athlete-Streamer.146
The case of the hybrid Athlete-Streamer, such as Tfue, presents
its own set of issues in separating the artist from the athlete in order to
determine the applicable law. The lines may become blurred, for
example, where things like endorsement deals come into play—are
they solely for the team as a professional athlete, or are they for the
alleged artist, namely, Tfue? The reason the distinction between
gamers who are pure Athletes and gamers who are Streamers or hybrid
Athlete-Streamers is so pivotal is that the TAA might not apply to
those gamers who are pure esports Athletes.147 There is some debate,
outside the scope of this Note, as to whether esports athletes are
actually athletes; there is some authority suggesting that, at least in the
United States, esports athletes are considered actual athletes
considering the fact that the United States has granted P-1A visas,
which are also known as the “athlete” visas, to some international
professional gamers before.148 Assuming they are legally considered
athletes, pure esports Athletes would be subject to a separate set of
athlete-specific laws governing Athlete agents, which vary depending
on the states and countries in which they compete.149 Where the TAA
covers artists, their contributions in entertainment, and those who
procure work for them in California, athletes are subject to a different
set of regulations, unless, of course, they cross over into the
145. Id.
146. See generally id. (explaining that in gaming it is the status quo for esports athletes to blend
their careers as streamers); see also Tfue—Results by Highest Prize Won, ESPORTS EARNINGS,
https://www.esportsearnings.com/players/38125-tfue-turner-tenney/results-by-prize (last visited
Apr. 11, 2021) (stating that Tfue, a professional streamer, has won hundreds of thousands as a
competitive esports Athlete playing Fortnite).
147. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700 et seq. (West, Westlaw through Ch. 9 of 2021 Reg. Sess.).
The TAA only applies to “artists” and people who procure artistic employment for artists.
148. These are evaluated on a case-by-case basis and also often denied for esports athletes. See
Jonathan Brannon, Are You Not Entertained? Considering the P-3 Visa as an Alternative Option
for International Esports Professional Gamers, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 754 (2018).
149. In California, section 18895 et seq. of the Business and Professions Code, also known as
the Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents Act, regulates the procurement of work for professional athletes,
and has some basic similarities to the TAA. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 18895 et seq. (West,
Westlaw through Ch. 9 of 2021 Reg. Sess.).
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entertainment space as artists as well.150 As discussed below, POs will
want to carefully consider how to approach and delineate their services
so as not to offend the TAA.
Considering the instability professional gamers who create
content for online streaming face, and the contrasting general stability
and recognition that a powerful brand name can give to an otherwise
lesser-known gamer, the fact that a popular entertainer might want to
join forces with a popular esports organization, and the organization
in turn embraces the entertainer, seems unsurprising. Such a mutually
beneficial relationship seems obvious, even. But this also might create
the set of circumstances that would entice a young, rising star seeking
an instant popularity boost to accept less than favorable terms to join
an established and popular organization, much like in Tfue’s case with
FaZe Clan.
b. The Lawsuit: Unforeseen Consequences of a Hopeful Signing
Tfue’s promising relationship with FaZe Clan was relatively
short-lived at just over a year.151 As Tfue skyrocketed in popularity,
the realities of his contract with FaZe Clan became clear: he was
contractually obliged to surrender a disproportionate share of his
earnings and a significant level of control to a PO in exchange for the
clout of FaZe Clan and its services.152
Tfue’s contract, titled “Gamer Agreement,” provides that in
exchange for “compensation,” Tfue will: (1) play on FaZe Clan’s
professional Fortnite team, in tournaments, training sessions, events
hosted by FaZe Clan; (2) provide publicity and promotional services,
including content creation (streaming) capped at 24 hours per month;
(3) participate in marketing for FaZe Clan, its sponsors, and brands
“as requested by [the c]ompany”; (4) represent FaZe Clan’s sponsors
and partners, including wearing FaZe Clan and its sponsors’
merchandise in public places, social media, or otherwise as
“reasonably requested”; (5) represent FaZe Clan in social media “as
instructed by [FaZe Clan]”; (6) participate in training sessions; and (7)
150. See Determination of Controversy at 8, Leonard v. Rebney, No. TAC-23-04 (Cal. Lab.
Comm’r July 1, 2005) (famous boxer Ray Leonard was an “artist” under the TAA for his host
position on The Contender).
151. Tfue’s deal with FaZe was announced on April 30, 2018; the lawsuit was filed just over a
year later, on May 20, 2019. See Complaint, supra note 16.
152. See id. at 3–4.
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participate in all LAN tournaments, major tournaments, League
matches, and online tournaments as requested by FaZe Clan.153
In exchange for these services, FaZe Clan promised Tfue a salary
of $2,000 per month, subject to a 25% increase or decrease at FaZe
Clan’s sole discretion after each six-month period.154 On top of this,
FaZe Clan and Tfue were to split the revenues Tfue earned as follows:
(1) cash prizes and tournament winnings split 80% to Tfue and 20%
to FaZe Clan; (2) in-game purchases split 50% to each; (3) personally
branded Tfue merchandise and apparel to “be negotiated separately”;
(4) brand deals with Tfue on either FaZe Clan’s or Tfue’s personal
“content creation platforms (e.g. Twitch/YouTube)” split at 50% to
each if Tfue brings the deal in himself; (5) brand deals with Tfue on
either FaZe Clan’s or Tfue’s personal “content creation platforms (e.g.
Twitch/YouTube)” split at 80% to FaZe Clan and 20% to Tfue if FaZe
Clan brings the deal to Tfue; (6) any team merchandise or apparel
featuring Tfue’s likeness, unrelated to FaZe Clan merchandise and
apparel, manufactured by or in conjunction with FaZe Clan split at
80% to FaZe Clan and 20% to Tfue; and (7) 50% each for Tfue’s
appearances, touring, sign-up bonuses, and “similar activities and
sources.”155
Interestingly, the contract also dictates that all payments be paid
directly to FaZe Clan, who will then remit Tfue his share monthly
within thirty days of each month’s end, unless prize money exceeded
$5,000, in which case it would be paid within thirty days of receipt by
FaZe Clan regardless of when received.156 This is not unlike a typical
talent agency.157 In fact, the TAA provides guidelines for an agency
receiving funds on behalf of the client: they must be deposited in a
trust fund account and remitted, less commission, within 30 days of
receipt.158 However, unlike Tfue’s contract with FaZe Clan, the
market commission charged by conventional talent agencies is
153. GAMER AGREEMENT 1–2 (Apr. 27, 2018), https://web.archive.org/web/20210209130645/
https://theblast.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/0522_Gamer_Agreement_Tfue_2.pdf.
154. Id. at 2.
155. Id. at 2–3.
156. Id. at 3.
157. See, e.g., How to Pay Your Agent, BACKSTAGE (June 15, 2015, 6:00 PM),
https://www.backstage.com/magazine/article/pay-agent-8943/ (describing how artist checks are
sent directly to the agency, who then puts them in a client trust account before deducting
commission and sending the remainder to the artist).
158. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.25 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 9 of 2021 Reg. Sess.).
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generally capped by union agreements—SAG-AFTRA, for example,
sets a maximum 10% commission, dependent on the type of deal
procured—as contrasted to the varying and seemingly quite high rates
charged by FaZe Clan.159
Further still, the contract’s Terms and Conditions contain an
exclusivity provision that requires not only that all sponsorship and
endorsement opportunities be expressly approved by FaZe Clan, but
also that FaZe Clan is “entitled to negotiate the terms and conditions
of any such opportunities presented to” Tfue and that FaZe Clan “will
also work to source sponsorship and/or endorsement opportunities on
behalf of” Tfue.160 This exclusivity grants FaZe Clan the right of
approval over any third-party requests for Tfue’s services, along with
a matching right against any future offers Tfue might receive from
other POs.161 These restrictive clauses, along with the allegedly
extremely high fee rates imposed by FaZe Clan, make up the central
issue at the heart of Tfue’s complaint.
Tfue’s complaint paints the typical player-signee such as himself
as young, unsophisticated, and trusting.162 Tfue highlights the fact that
esports revenue is driven significantly by the creative efforts of
professional gamers, and that “[b]ecause the esports industry is so
new, there is little to no regulation or oversight.”163 Meanwhile, Tfue
paints FaZe Clan as opportunistic and “grossly oppressive” for
pushing such one-sided and restrictive contractual terms on Tfue.164
Tfue alleges that FaZe Clan subscribes to the contractual businessmodel imposed on Tfue with all of its signings generally in an attempt
to “‘own’ [Tfue] and other content creator/streamers and professional
gamers.”165 Arguing that the contract is illegal and anti-competitive,
Tfue especially focuses on the fact that he is contractually obliged to
surrender up to 80% of his earnings in some circumstances, and,
importantly, that “FaZe Clan continuously and systematically

159. See Frequently Asked Questions: Agency Representation, SAG-AFTRA,
https://www.sagaftra.org/contracts-industry-resources/agents-managers/frequently-askedquestions (last visited Apr. 11, 2021) (under “When and how much should I pay my agent?”).
160. GAMER AGREEMENT, supra note 153, at 8.
161. Id.
162. See Complaint, supra note 16.
163. Id. at 2.
164. See id. at 2–3.
165. Id.
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procures and attempts to procure employment and engagements for
[Tfue] as an artist in violation of” the TAA.166
Before settling the suit, Tfue’s complaint was dismissed in
California, largely due to the fact that the contract had a forum
selection clause granting exclusive jurisdiction over contractual
disagreements to courts of New York; in so ruling, however, Tfue’s
petition before the CLC remained active because the CLC “has
exclusive jurisdiction over the question of whether the TAA
applies.”167 Judge Patricia Nieto described the TAA as “unwaivable,”
and held that the “TAA was created for a public purpose, and [Tfue]
therefore cannot waive these rights through the forum selection
clause.”168 Unfortunately, due to the subsequent settlement, the CLC
still has yet to weigh in on the ultimate status of gamers as artists.
Tfue’s Petition to the CLC (the “Petition”) describes the allegedly
illegal and unlicensed agency relationship as one in which “FaZe Clan
secures the purported right to procure employment or engagements”
for Tfue and thus that “FaZe Clan’s primary and essential function is
to promote and sell [Tfue]’s artistic services and procure sponsorship
deals which feature those services.”169 Thereafter, FaZe Clan “retains
a grossly unconscionable commission for sourcing the deal.”170 Tfue’s
petition describes Tfue’s multifaceted revenue sources, such as
promotions on Twitch, YouTube, and Instagram.171 Tfue alleges that
FaZe Clan “actively participated in the procurement and negotiation
of sponsorship deals which included [Tfue]’s services as an artist,”
specifically meaning that Tfue would perform in videos for sponsors,
such as “a video for sponsor Digital Storm promoting Digital Storm’s
products that garnered over 19 million views.”172 FaZe Clan also
allegedly procured “modeling engagements” where Tfue would
“model apparel and jewelry for certain sponsors.”173
166. Id. at 3.
167. Bill Chang, The FaZe Clan v. Tfue Case Continues, GAME CHANGERS (June 24, 2020),
https://www.gamechangerslaw.com/blog/ufppfr7w8cyrnv5y1vfiy5lrnp2i22.
168. Patrick Shanley, Esports Star Tfue’s California Fight with FaZe Clan Paused by Judge,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Dec. 6, 2019, 10:20 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/esportsstar-tfues-california-fight-faze-clan-paused-by-judge-1259879.
169. Complaint, supra note 16, at 3 n.2.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2–3.
172. Id. at 4.
173. Id.
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Tfue further alleges that, in violation of the TAA’s prohibition
against sending an artist to unsafe places and other safety-related
provisions,174 FaZe Clan “pressured” Tfue to move to Los Angeles
and “to live in one of FaZe Clan’s homes,” where, before Tfue turned
twenty-one, parties were “fueled by alcohol” and FaZe Clan
encouraged illicit gambling.175 FaZe Clan also allegedly encouraged
Tfue to undertake dangerous stunts in videos, and in one such stunt he
injured his arm while skateboarding, suffering permanent
disfigurement.176 If true, the outlook would be troubling for FaZe
Clan.
c. The Act Protects: Professional Gamers Like Tfue Qualify for
Protection as Artists under the TAA from Unlicensed Esports
Organizations Acting as Talent Agencies
Until legislation is enacted that specifically addresses esports and
the unique challenges professional gamers face, thereby balancing the
previously examined power disparity, the TAA may provide an initial
line of defense in California for young and hopeful content creators
hoping to sign with an established PO. This is rooted in the recognition
that many professional gamers should qualify as artists under the
TAA. Thus, the procurement of employment for these artists in
California without a proper talent agency license should render
contracts between POs and their talent “illegal and void ab initio.”177
POs will want to carefully consider: the type of gamer they are
signing; the contractual obligations they sign them to; the services they
offer the gamer; and whether or not they are willing to risk voided
contracts and, consequently, forfeited cash.
As an initial matter, given the CLC’s consistently broad reading
of the TAA and the types of persons who qualify as artists
historically,178 it is a logical conclusion to consider professional
Streamers, who spend thousands of hours creating content for their
174. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.33–.35 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 9 of 2021 Reg. Sess.).
175. Petition to Determine Controversy at 4, Tenney v. FaZe Clan Inc., No. 52704 (Cal. Lab.
Comm’r May 15, 2019).
176. Id. at 5.
177. Styne v. Stevens, 26 P.3d 343, 346 (Cal. 2001).
178. Recall, for example, the finding that hosting The Contender rendered boxer Ray Leonard
an “artist” in the eyes of the CLC (Leonard v. Rebney, No. TAC-23-04 (Cal. Lab. Comm’r July 1,
2005)), and that “Dog” the bounty hunter qualified as well (Chapman v. Krutonog, No. TAC 3351
(Cal. Lab. Comm’r Oct. 31, 2012)).
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fans to “boost ratings” and promote their on-stream personas,179 as
artists. While the extent of a professional gamer’s rights to their
created content is limited at best due to the inevitable nature of game
streams as derivative works on the Publisher’s copyrighted games,180
there is little doubt that these contributions are the works of artists, at
the very least under the broad definition granted by the TAA.181
Using Tfue as an example, the hybrid Streamer-Athlete presents
another wrinkle, because separating the Athlete from the Artist may
prove challenging when so much of their dual professional lives
intertwine. But should this even matter? As Leonard v. Rebney held, a
celebrity’s status as an athlete is irrelevant when that celebrity takes
on the role of an artist, because the TAA was meant to “protect artists
in their capacities as artists, and to regulate persons who procure
artistic employment for artists.”182 Thus, to the extent that FaZe Clan
used Tfue’s fame and personality to promote partners’ products and
promote the FaZe Clan brand, procured sponsorship deals for Tfue,
and otherwise negotiated and represented Tfue in his artistic business
deals, FaZe Clan acted as Tfue’s talent agency. Without proper
licensure, FaZe Clan was acting illegally in California.
While Tfue streaming on FaZe Clan’s channels could have been
subject to a valid contractual employment agreement between private
parties and competing in tournaments as a FaZe Clan teammate was
ostensibly a valid contractual athlete agreement, FaZe Clan chose to
subject Tfue to all his contractual agreements under one transaction.
Thus, if Tfue’s allegations had proven true in hearings before the CLC,
the CLC likely would have voided Tfue’s contract with FaZe Clan in
its entirety and ordered FaZe Clan to remit any revenue earned by Tfue
under contract in full to Tfue.183 The central purpose of the contract
179. See Leonard v. Rebney, No. TAC-23-04 (Cal. Lab. Comm’r July 1, 2005). While the
author does not promote a “sweat of the brow” approach to for defining an artist, the overall
entertainment factor, as it pertains to promotional value, is something the CLC considers in
determining whether someone is an artist.
180. See Copyright in Esports, supra note 25.
181. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 9 of 2021 Reg. Sess.).
182. See Leonard v. Rebney, No. TAC-23-04 at 9 (Cal. Lab. Comm’r July 1, 2005) (emphasis
added).
183. Recall that while the doctrine of severability theoretically could apply, the decision to
sever illegal portions of a contract is solely within the CLC’s discretion; historically, this means
voiding the entire contract unless the procured employment is “collateral to the main objective of
the contract.” See Yoakam v. The Fitzgerald Hartley Co., No. TAC 8744 at 21 (Cal. Lab. Comm’r
Jan. 9, 2009); Marathon Ent., Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 754 (Cal. 2008).
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was arguably procuring employment for Tfue in exchange for massive
commissions. Apart from competitive tournaments, the focus of
Tfue’s contractual duties significantly revolves around promotion,
brand deals, streaming, merchandising, and touring.184 It seems that
Tfue’s competitive prowess may have been ancillary to his ability to
drive promotional and marketing revenue for FaZe Clan and its
sponsors. Further, even if the CLC found the procurement of
employment to be entirely collateral to the purpose of the contract,185
FaZe Clan would still be subject to a void contract and would have to
surrender any commissions that were the result of illegally procured
employment for Tfue. While FaZe Clan asserted it only actually took
$60,000 from Tfue’s services, Tfue vehemently disputed this and
ultimately the truth would have been ascertained in discovery during
the course of the now-settled litigation.186 Either way, at a minimum,
$60,000 was at stake for FaZe Clan.
FaZe Clan undoubtedly brought value to Tfue, and based on the
popularity of the organization, it also brings significant value to the
esports industry as a whole.187 In order to protect the legitimate value
of the business, FaZe Clan and other POs like it should consider taking
steps to position themselves to continue creating value for their gamers
and their organizations. Unless specific legislation is enacted for
esports that removes gamers from the “artist” pool, POs will have to
comply with the dictates of the TAA if they want to continue procuring
work for their artist-gamers in an agency-like capacity. This means,
first, applying for and obtaining a talent agency license from the office
of the CLC under Article 2 of the TAA.188 POs like FaZe Clan should
consider segregating the business to clearly delineate the pure esports
business from a properly licensed “agency” arm, which will procure
work in sponsorships, streaming, apparel, modeling, and other
“artistic” functions of their talent. Thus, they could also consider
having separate Athlete and Artist contracts for their gamers such that
184. See Gamer Agreement, supra note 153, at 2.
185. See Yoakam v. The Fitzgerald Hartley Co., No. TAC 8744 (Cal. Lab. Comm’r Jan. 9,
2009).
186. See, e.g., Ben Walker, Tfue’s Lawyer Says that FaZe Clan Taking Only $60,000 Is “a
Complete Fiction,” DOT ESPORTS (June 15, 2019, 10:04 AM), https://dotesports.com/business/ne
ws/tfues-lawyer-says-that-faze-clan-taking-only-60k-is-a-complete-fiction.
187. See, e.g., Tfue, supra note 29; Khal, supra note 95.
188. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.5–.22 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 9 of 2021 Reg. Sess.).
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in the event of any violations of the TAA, the Athlete-only contract is
safely separated from the CLC’s TAA purview.
Separating the business clearly into both an esports Athlete and
esports Artist operation would also help them to better formulate
contracts with transparency and ensure they are not at risk of
eschewing the legal framework of the TAA. Because every Artist’s
contract must be submitted to the CLC for approval, it is entirely
possible that the commissions charged in a contract like Tfue and FaZe
Clan’s would have to be lower to gain approval.189 This further
highlights the need for unionization of professional gamers where,
subject to collective bargaining agreements, caps and floors can be set
for commission rates not unlike collective bargaining agreements in
traditional entertainment and sports.190 In reality, POs are not the
esports villain, but where sudden fame results in big business placed
in the hands of inexperienced stars, some short-sighted decisions have
jeopardized otherwise legitimately valuable operations.
A brief note—pure esports Athletes are out of luck as pertains to
the TAA. As discussed earlier, the TAA only protects artists. So,
unless their teams procure artistic employment for them, such as
promoting a sponsor’s product in a commercial,191 Athletes will have
to rely on athlete-specific legal frameworks until the federal or state
legislatures adopt esports-specific legislation. Thus, esports Athletes
should carefully consider contracts they sign with their teams and are
encouraged to retain counsel when negotiating their contracts to avoid
a Tfue-like situation.
Not only does the case of Tfue and FaZe Clan highlight the need
for an esports players’ association to solidify proper guidelines for
189. See id. § 1700.23. While the commission rates might be lower, POs at least would no
longer risk losing them altogether.
190. For example, SAG-AFTRA requires that any union member who engages the services of
an agent uses a “franchised agent,” which is one who agrees to abide by certain SAG-AFTRA rules,
including commission capped at 10%. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 158.
191. Note, however, that using recordings of their competitive performances in tournaments
may be fair game. See NAT’L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS’N, NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT 221–22 (2017), https://atlhawksfanatic.github.io/NBA-CBA/nba-cba-2017.pdf
(under the Unauthorized Endorsements/Sponsor Promotion section, “it shall not be an Endorsement
for the NBA, a League-related entity or an NBA Team to use, or authorize others to use, including,
without limitation, in third party advertising and promotional materials, footage and photographs
of a player’s participation in NBA games or other NBA events that do not unduly focus on, feature,
or highlight, such player in a manner that leads the reasonable consumer to believe that such player
is a spokesman for, or promoter of, a third-party commercial product or service”).
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POs signing young stars, but it also spotlights the need for federal and
state legislatures to duly enact esports-specific legislation.
Specifically, the legislation should protect professional gamers
similarly to the way the TAA protects “traditional” artists but
recognize the unique and dynamic business that esports
encompasses.192 Using the TAA as a paradigm, an esports-specific
regulatory scheme can bypass the “athlete or artist” question entirely
and properly protect the biggest and smallest stars in a currently
unregulated billion dollar industry.193
IV. CONCLUSION
Where a multifaceted contract purports to control things such as
a Streamer’s right to their own created content, their sponsorship
deals, team and tournament competitions, merchandising, and more,
the benefit of sound advice from legal counsel and proper negotiations
could save someone like Tfue the trouble of suing an organization like
FaZe Clan. Still, FaZe Clan made its own mistake when it ignored the
TAA; a contract on more favorable terms to Tfue, but with the same
general obligations, still could have been subject to the CLC’s wrath.
Tfue’s complaint summarizes the crux of the issue:
Until now, Faze Clan has enjoyed the fruits of this illegal
business model with impunity because no-one could or was
willing to stand up to Faze Clan. Those days are over.
Through this action, [Tfue] seeks to shift the balance of
power to the gamers and content creators/streamers, those
who are actually creating value and driving the industry. As
a result of this action, others will hopefully take notice of
what is going on and help to clean up esports.194
Others certainly have taken notice, and even though Tfue and
FaZe Clan have managed to peaceably settle the litigation on
undisclosed terms, the impetus for change in esports called for in the
192. See, e.g., Chao, supra note 56 at 763 (calling for federal regulation that “promotes basic
gaming rights and ethics—like protection for minors and player employees—and also supports the
legitimacy of a domestic esports association”).
193. See James Ayles, Global Esports Revenue Reaches More than $1 Billion as Audience
Figures Exceed 433 Million, FORBES (Dec. 3, 2019, 6:36 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jam
esayles/2019/12/03/global-esports-revenue-reaches-more-than-1-billion-as-audience-figuresexceed-433-million/.
194. Complaint, supra note 16, at 4.
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lawsuit cannot be ignored. Organizations like FaZe Clan have
apparently benefitted from a largely unregulated “wild west”195 by
leveraging their superior bargaining position to sign gamers like Tfue
to profitable contracts that, ultimately, are illegal. Without proper
licensure, FaZe Clan and other POs cannot legally procure
employment in California for their artists without risking losing the
talent, and the money they bring, entirely. While POs unquestionably
bring significant value to the professional gamers on their roster and
the esports industry as a whole, they should more carefully structure
their business and their contracts to ensure they do not run afoul of the
protective veil of the TAA. Further, federal and state legislatures ought
to recognize esports as an industry in dire need of regulation and act
accordingly. Professional gamers who act as Streamers and hybrid
Athlete-Streamers are artists subject to the TAA’s protection. Thus, as
the business of esports has risen into legitimacy, the forces that control
these professional gamers’ lives and careers from within the industry
must follow suit.

195. The characterization of the esports industry as a new form of the “wild west” is not
uncommon. See, e.g., Graham Ashton, Governing the Wild West—An Introduction to Esports
Federations and Associations, ESPORTS OBSERVER (Jan. 3, 2019), https://esportsobserver.com/es
ports-federations-intro/.

